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THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS:
STATE DEFAMATION LAW IN THE WAKE OF
GERTZ v. ROBERT WELCH, INC.
[I]t is of profound importance for the Court to
to come to rest in the defamation area ....
Justice Blackmun, concurring in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.'
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 a landmark decision apply-
ing first amendment principles to state defamation law, the Supreme
Court ruled that a public official could not recover damages in a libel
action against a newspaper unless there were proof of actual malice.'
Although the Court has extended the New York Times constitutional
privilege to other situations, it has never applied first amendment prin-
ciples to purely private defamations. 4 Instead, private defamations -
actions involving a private plaintiff and a nonmedia defendant and
defamatory statements of a nonpublic nature - traditionally have
been governed by common law principles. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
1. 418 U.S. 323, 354 (1974).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. The Court held that in cases where the plaintiff was a public official, the
first amendment conferred a qualified privilege upon a defamatory statement made
by the defendant. This privilege could be overcome only by a showing that the state-
ment had been made with "actual malice," that is, with knowledge that the statement
was false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. See 376 U.S. at 279;
notes 90 to 104 and accompanying text infra.
4. The line of cases from New York Times to Gertz presented clear first
amendment issues; the plaintiffs were public officials, see New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), or public figures, see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967). Most defendants were members of the media, see Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.E. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Publish-
ing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389
U.S. 81 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
For cases in which defendants were not members of the media, see, e.g., Letter Carriers
v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) ; St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (tele-
vised political speech that referred to the plaintiff) ; Linn v. Plant Guard Workers,
383 U.S. 53 (1966) (publications made by union officials during labor disputes);
Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (defamatory letter and telephone call made
by criminal suspect); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (statement made
by district attorney at press conference). In one case, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), the defamatory statements concerned matters of public
interest; however, this "public or general interest" test was rejected by the Court in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See note 111 and accompanying
text infra.
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Inc.,' a defamation case with a private plaintiff6 and a media defendant,
the Court attempted to strike conclusively the correct balance between
the state's interest in compensating the private plaintiff for the injury
to his reputation and the media defendant's constitutional right to
free expression On its face, the Gertz decision did not control cases
in which the defendant was not a member of the media.' In Jacron
Sales Co. v. Sindorf and General Motors Corp. v. Piskor,' how-
ever, the Maryland Court of Appeals confronted two cases of purely
private defamation and decided to apply Gertz, rather than the com-
mon law principles that had previously governed defamation actions
in Maryland."
During the period between the Supreme Court's decision in New
York Times and the Court of Appeal's decision in Jacron, the law of
defamation in Maryland had been divided into two branches. One
branch flowed from the common law tradition and was based upon
society's ancient concern with providing a remedy for injury to per-
sonal reputation. 12 The second flowed directly from the New York
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6. Id. at 351. The Court found that Gertz did not qualify as a public figure
under either of its alternative bases:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety
that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More com-
monly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.
Id. at 351. Prior to Gertz, the accepted statement of the constitutional standard regard-
ing public figures was found in Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967): "[M]any who do not hold
public office at the moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of con-
cern to society at large." Id. at 164. The Gertz decision narrowed Chief Justice
Warren's definition, and the Gertz test in turn was narrowed in Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), where the Court held that a prominent and wealthy socialite
involved in a widely publicized divorce proceeding was not a public figure.
7. Id. at 342-48.
8. See notes 53, 132 & 133 and accompanying text infra.
9. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
10. 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976).
11. 276 Md. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695; 277 Md. at 171, 352 A.2d at 814.
12. In the middle ages reputation was considered sacred, and men were prepared
to duel to defend their honor and good name. It was in part to provide a remedy for
injury to reputation and in part to prevent a resort to violence that the local feudal
courts heard actions for defamation. See Developments in the Law - Defamation,
69 HARv. L. Rav. 875, 877 (1956). Early penalties ran the gamut from the violent to
the absurd. In King Alfred's reign, a slanderer could have his tongue cut out. How-
ever, some penalties seemed designed merely to embarass the culprit; for example, a
slanderer could be made publicly to call himself a liar while holding his nose with
his fingers. In addition, damage payments were available even in the earliest claims.
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Times decision and its progeny,'" finding its source in the first amend-
ment 4 and the "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' 5
The divergence of defamation law into two branches was taken for
granted until the Gertz decision, which held that the New York Times
standard for determining the liability of media defendants in defama-
ion actions did not adequately protect the reputation of private plaintiffs.
The Court encouraged the states to formulate alternative standards
less stringent than strict liability,"' but it also limited the power of
the states to grant presumed and punitive damages in cases involving
private plaintiffs and media defendants.' The Court's holdings blurred
the distinctions between the common law and constitutional branches,
on the one hand, by expanding the states' roles in defining constitu-
tionally acceptable standards of liability for media defendants and, on
the other, by limiting the traditional common law scheme of damages
in defamation cases. Because Gertz altered many of the common law
principles of libel and slander that had governed actions against media
defendants, the decision raised questions about the vitality of the com-
mon law approach in other kinds of defamation cases. Furthermore,
it was unclear whether Gertz should be limited to cases involving media
defendants or whether its holdings should apply to all cases where the
plaintiff is a private person.' 8 Maryland chose the latter view.
See Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REv.
546, 548-49 (1903).
After the decline of the local feudal courts in England, jurisdiction over
defamation actions became fragmented. While the ecclesiastical courts punished the
"sin" of slander by imposing penance upon the guilty party, the common law courts
punished only those offenders whose actions had resulted in demonstrable "temporal
damages" to the plaintiff. See Ogden v. Turner, 87 Eng. Rep. 862 (1703). The crime
of political libel was the province of the Star Chamber, which eventually acquired
jurisdiction over civil libel as well. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
738 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
13. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc,
418 U.S. 323 (1974); Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Beckley
Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967) ; Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) ; Linn v. Plant Guard
Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
14. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
15. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
16. 418 U.S. at 347.
17. Id. at 349.
18. For a description of the defamation landscape after Gertz, see Eaton, The
American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An
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STATE DEFAMATION LAW
In Jacron and Piskor, the Court of Appeals unified the common
law and constitutional doctrines of defamation by applying Gertz to
cases of purely private defamation. The court decided that, as a
matter of state law, in the absence of a privilege a negligence standard
of liability should be applied in all private defamation cases, regard-
less of the nature of the statement or the identity of the defendant.Y
In reaching this resolution, the court reshaped the common law of
defamation in the Gertz constitutional mold. Although no other state
court had adopted a unitary approach to defamation law, 0 the two
branches of the law were joined in Maryland under the principles of
the Gertz decision.
This note will examine these Court of Appeals decisions in two
contexts: first, the implications of the decisions for the future of
common law defamation actions in Maryland and other jurisdictions,
and second, the extent to which Gertz mandates such fundamental
changes in state defamation law.
Two "PURELY PRIVATE" DEFAMATIONS
Both Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf21 and General Motors Corp.
v. Piskor2 2 involved purely private defamations; neither plaintiff was
a public figure, the defamatory statement did not relate to a matter
of public interest, and neither defendant was a member of the media.
In Jacron, the plaintiff, Jack Sindorf, resigned after working eighteen
months as a construction tools salesman for the Jacron Sales Company.
Sindorf notified his employer that he intended to retain company in-
ventory until he received unpaid commissions and other expenses.28
Subsequently, the vice-president of Jacron gratuitously volunteered to
Sindorf's new employer that upon Sindorf's departure there were
C'quite a few cash sales and quite a bit of merchandise uncounted
[sic] for.' ",24 The trial court, ruling that Sindorf had established
slander per se25 but that Jacron was protected by a common law
Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1450-51 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Defama-
tion Through Gertz].
19. See 276 Md. at 596, 350 A.2d at 697.
20. See, e.g., Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975);
notes 140 to 172 and accompanying text infra.
21. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
22. 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976).
23. 276 Md. at 582, 350 A.2d at 689-90.
24. Id. at 582-83, 350 A.2d at 690.
25. The general rule at common law was that slander was not actionable without
proof of special damages. Slander per se was an exception to this general rule and
did not condition a plaintiff's recovery on proof of actual harm. Four kinds of slander
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conditional privilege,2 6 directed a verdict for Jacron on the ground
that Sindorf had failed to overcome that privilege by a showing of
actual malice.27 In Piskor, on the other hand, the trial resulted in a
were labeled per se at common law and included words imputing crime, loathsome
disease, unchastity to a woman, and words reflecting unfavorably upon a person's
business, trade, profession or office. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 754-60. See
generally Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy - The Requirement
of Proof of Damages in Libel Actions, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 1 (1972).
26. Common law privileges - immunities from liability for defamatory state-
ments - are grounded in social policies that encourage and protect some communica-
tions. Absolute privileges, or complete immunity from liability, are limited to a few
areas of expression including legislative and judicial proceedings, executive com-
munications, political broadcasts, situations in which the plaintiff has consented to
the publication of the statement, and where one spouse has made a statement about
the other. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 766-85. Qualified or conditional privileges
are available only where the communication is made "in a reasonable manner and for
a proper purpose," see PROSSER, supra note 12, at 785-92, and are defeasible upon a
showing of malice or a showing that the defendant has otherwise abused the privilege.
See note 27 infra. Generally some common interest or duty must exist between the
publisher and the recipient, and the communication must be reasonably designed to
protect or further that interest. See Hanrahan v. Kelly, 269 Md. 21, 28, 305 A.2d 151,
156 (1973). Qualified privileges are available to the publisher who makes a statement
to protect his own interests, the interest of others, or an interest shared by the recipient.
Further, communications to law enforcement officers or others acting in the public
interest are conditionally privileged, as are fair comments on matters of public con-
cern and reports of public proceedings. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 785-92. For
example, in Jacron the common interest arose between former and present employers.
Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Corp., 27 Md. App. 53, 69, 341 A.2d 856, 866 (1975). See also
Hanrahan v. Kelly, supra, Deckelman v. Lake, 149 Md. 533, 131 A. 762 (1926);
Bavington v. Robinson, 124 Md. 85, 91 A. 777 (1914) ; Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 20
A. 774 (1890). In Piskor, the privilege was based upon General Motors' interest in
protecting itself against theft. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 27 Md. App. 95,
126-27, 340 A.2d 767, 787-88 (1975) ; PROSSER, supra note 12, at 786. Where a defend-
ant alleges that a qualified or conditional privilege insulates him from liability for a
defamatory statement, the plaintiff may overcome this defense by showing that the
statement was made maliciously or in an unreasonable manner. See generally PROSSER,
supra note 12, at 794-95. The concept of malice has gradually been narrowed. See
note 27 infra.
27. In early cases, common law or "express" malice was defined by the courts
in terms of "ill-will," "malicious feeling," and "evil intent," although the same cases
also indicated that malice involved elements of knowing falsity and gross negligence.
See, e.g., Deckelman v. Lake, 149 Md. 533, 131 A. 762 (1926); Fresh v. Cutter, 73
Md. 87, 20 A. 774 (1890). Recent Maryland cases have emphasized the standard of
actual malice, or reckless disregard for the truth. See Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md. 285,
277 A.2d 573 (1971) ; Stevenson v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 250 Md. 482, 243
A.2d 533 (1968). A finding of malice under Maryland law has not been limited to
these characterizations, however. The court in Orrison v. Vance noted that
[iln determining an abuse of privilege all relevant circumstances are admis-
sible . . . , including the defendant's reasonable belief in the truth of his state-
ments .... the excessive nature of the language used . . . , whether the disclosures
were unsolicited . . . , and whether the communication was made in a proper
manner and only to proper parties.
262 Md. 285, 295, 277 A.2d 573, 578 (1971).
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jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff .2  Piskor, a General Motors assem-
bly line worker, had been stopped by General Motors plant security
guards after his shift. Alerted by a suspicious foreman, the guards
forced Piskor into a glass-walled security checkpoint to determine
whether he was concealing parts taken from one of the assembly lines.2
His detainment occurred in full view of approximately 5000 employees
who were changing shifts.80 The jury found that the guards' conduct
amounted to slander per se and that the defendant had lost its con-
ditional privilege by "excessive publication."'"
In both cases, traditional common law principles, applied with-
out reference to the Supreme Court defamation decisions, provided
the basis for decision at the trial level. On appeal, however, the Court
of Special Appeals ordered both cases reargued in order to assess the
effect of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gertz."2 The court
decided the Jacron case first and ruled that Gertz did not extend to
"purely private" defamation but applied "only when a private indi-
vidual is defamed as to a matter of public or general interest,"' S a
standard that echoed the Supreme Court's pre-Gertz plurality decision
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 4 The court reasoned that, regard-
less of the status of the defamer, in defamation of a private nature,
"no First Amendment values are at stake, the application of the con-
stitutional privilege is unnecessary and unwarranted, and the states
28. 277 Md. at 167, 352 A.2d at 812. Piskor was awarded compensatory damages
of $1000 for slander, $300 for assault and $200 for false imprisonment plus $25,000
punitive damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the punitive damage award on
the ground that Piskor could not recover presumed or punitive damages on the
slander count unless he met the New York Times actual malice standard. Because
only one award of punitive damages was made, it was not possible to determine the
extent to which the award reflected the slander. Id. at 175, 352 A.2d at 817.
29. Id. at 167-68, 352 A.2d at 812-15.
30. Id. at 168, 352 A.2d at 813.
31. Id. at 173, 352 A.2d at 816. See also notes 26 & 27 supra.
32. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 27 Md. App. 95, 99, 340 A.2d 767, 772 (1975).
33. Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md. App. 53, 90, 341 A.2d 856, 878. See Calero
v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975), which reached the same
result through analysis similar to that used by the Court of Special Appeals. Calero
is discussed at notes 158 to 166 and accompanying text infra.
34. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See notes 99 & 100 and accompanying text infra. The
Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Gertz had rejected
the Rosenbloom plurality opinion. 27 Md. App. at 85, 341 A.2d at 876. The court's
reliance upon the Rosenbloom test is therefore somewhat inexplicable, even if one
accepts the court's conclusion that "[a]s every decision on the subject from New
York Times to Gertz shows, the 'speech that matters' is that relating to issues of
general or public interest." Id. at 89, 341 A.2d at 878.
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are free to define the limits of recovery." 'a3 State common law there-
fore controlled. 8
In Jacron, the first of the companion cases to reach the Court of
Appeals, the court agreed with the lower court's characterization of
the case as one of purely private defamation but differed with the
determination that Gertz was inapplicable." The Court of Appeals
rejected the Court of Special Appeals' view that in cases where the
plaintiff is a private person, the first amendment protected only speech
relating to the "general or public interest." The court noted that Gertz
had rejected the public interest test for applying the New York Times
standard of actual malice because it afforded insufficient protection to
the reputation of a private person injured by defamatory material.88
Having dispensed with the public interest test advanced by the
lower court, the Court of Appeals did not retreat to the familiar boun-
daries of the common law; instead, it held that Gertz applied to all
cases of private defamation regardless of the status of the defendants"
and that negligence was the appropriate standard for determining
liability.40 As a result, the plaintiffs in Jacron and Piskor could not
merely establish defamation per se and recover on a theory of strict
liability; proof of some fault on the part of the defamers would be
necessary. In addition, the court retained the common law conditional
privileges, which can be overcome only by meeting the more stringent
35. 27 Md. App. at 90, 341 A.2d at 878.
36. Id. at 93, 341 A.2d at 880. In Piskor, the Court of Special Appeals outlined
the options available to it in Jacron:
[W]e saw three paths which could be followed in applying [the Gertz] holdings:
(1) they applied to all defamations; (2) they applied only to defamations in-
volving matters of public or general interest, thus excluding purely private defa-
mations; [or] (3) they applied only to defamations in which the media were
the means of the defamatory injury. We avoided the first path because we be-
lieved that it was not constitutionally required that we follow it. Its route led
to a scuttling of much of the prevailing defamation law of Maryland as to matters
which were of no concern to the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press.
We chose the second path and rejected the third for reasons fully set out in
[Jacron].
27 Md. App. at 100, 340 A.2d at 773. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
369-404 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). (Justice White argued that Gertz amounted
to an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with state defamation law.)
37. 276 Md. at 584, 350 A2d at 690-91.
38. Id. at 588-89, 350 A.2d at 693.
39. Id. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695. The Court of Special Appeals likewise rejected
the notion that Gertz applied only in a media context, for the reason that "[n]on-media
defendants ... may also be an important source of public interest items [and to] leave
them unprotected would defeat the whole purpose of the constitutional privilege."
27 Md. App. at 94, 341 A.2d at 881.
40. 276 Md. at 596-97, 350 A2d at 697-98.
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standard of actual malice traditionally required in Maryland.4' Two
months after Jacron the Court of Appeals, in General Motors Corp.
v. Piskor,4 2 reaffirmed its application of the Gertz principles to state
defamation law.4" In reviewing the award of punitive damages to
Piskor, it adopted the Gertz holding on damages, which permits the
award of presumed or punitive damages only where the New York
Times standard for actual malice - knowing or reckless falsity -
is satisfied.44
PRACTICAL EFFECTS
On a practical level, the Court of Appeals' decisions in Jacron
and Piskor changed the complexion of defamation actions in Mary-
land.45 A brief summary of the impact of the decisions upon various
aspects of the typical cause of action indicates the scope of these changes.
Plaintiffs
Jacron. was the first decision that applied the Supreme Court's
defamation decisions to a private plaintiff in a suit arising from private
defamation.48 After Jacron the principles of Gertz govern all private
defamation plaintiffs without regard to the subject matter of the
defamatory statement.47 In order to satisfy Gertz, private plaintiffs
must show some fault on the part of the defendant and prove actual
damages.4 If they seek to recover presumed and punitive damages,
they must meet the New York Times standard for actual malice.4"
These requirements apply regardless of whether a plaintiff has been
defamed by a newspaper story or by an oral statement of a neighbor.5 °
Plaintiffs who are public figures or officials will continue to be gov-
erned by the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times.5 In
41. Id. at 597-601, 350 A2d at 698-700. See note 27 supra; notes 83 to 85 and
accompanying text infra.
42. 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976).
43. Id. at 171-72, 352 A.2d at 814-15.
44. Id. at 174-75, 352 A.2d at 816-17.
45. See Stephens v. Dixon, 30 Md. App. 56, 66, 351 A.2d 187, 193 (1976).
46. See notes 140 to 172 and accompanying text infra.
47. 276 Md. at 590, 350 A.2d at 694.
48. See 418 U.S. at 347; 276 Md. at 596-97, 350 A2d at 696; notes 71 to 76 and
accompanying text infra.
For a discussion of actual damage, see notes 86 to 87 and accompanying
text infra.
49. See 418 U.S. at 349-50; notes 86 to 89 and accompanying text infra.
50. See 276 Md. at 592-93, 350 A.2d at 695; notes 53 to 55 and accompanying
text infra.
51. See also cases cited in note 13 supra.
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order to recover any damages, they must prove actual malice on the
part of the defendant. 2
Defendants
The Court of Appeals refused to confine Gertz to cases involving
media defendants, though it acknowledged that "[i]t is plain that the
holding in Gertz was limited to media expression."5 3 Rather, the
court predicted that the Supreme Court was likely to extend the Gertz
decision to nonmedia defendants, as it had with Newu York Times."'
Furthermore, the court observed that it would be illogical and im-
proper to apply one standard of fault to media defendants and a dif-
ferent standard to nonmedia defendants.5 5 The consequence of this
reasoning is that strict liability for defamatory statements will no
longer be imposed upon any defendant in Maryland; some degree of
fault must be shown.5" In practice, moreover, few private defendants
will be held to a negligence standard because most "private" defama-
tions, as in Jacron and Piskor, arise in the context of one or more of
the common law conditional privileges,57 which continue to be avail-
able under the Court of Appeals decisions.58  If a defendant is pro-
tected by a common law privilege, he will be liable only on a showing
52. See 418 U.S. at 342-43.
53. 276 Md. at 590, 350 A.2d at 694. It should be noted that the Supreme Court
established a balancing scheme in Gertz: "[tihe need to avoid self-censorship by the
news media" was weighed against "[tihe legitimate state interest [in] the compen-
sation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood." 418
U.S. at 341. See notes 130 & 137 and accompanying text infra.
54. The Court of Appeals cited Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)
(labor dispute); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (statements made
during televised speech) ; Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (labor
disputes) ; Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (letter to deputy sheriff and state-
ment made to wire services) ; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (statement
made during press conference); Evans v. Lawson, 351 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Va.
1972) (letter sent to members of private club) ; Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App.
2d 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1966) (campaign material); Rowden v. Amick, 446 S.W.2d
849 (Mo. App. 1969) (letters to members of community). See 276 Md. at 591-92
& n.7, 350 A.2d at 695 & n.7.
55. The court noted that "[i]ssues of public interest may equally be discussed in
media and non-media contexts, and the need for a constitutional privilege, therefore,
obtains in either case." 276 Md. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695. See notes 134 to 137 and
accompanying text infra.
56. 276 Md. at 596-97, 350 A.2d at 697-98.
57. See Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RuTGRms-CAmDEN L.J. 471,
511 (1975).
58. See notes 83 to 85 and accompanying text infra.
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of malice, either New York Times malice or one of the alternative
standards still available in Maryland.59
Pleading
Citing the "compelling need for consistency and simplicity in the
law of defamation," the Court of Appeals ended the ancient common
law dichotomy between libel and slander. 60 It seems clear that a
plaintiff will no longer suffer any penalty for incorrectly labelling his
cause of action;61 indeed, the characterization of a defamatory state-
ment as libel or slander after Jacron will have little practical signifi-
cance.62 Furthermore, it seems apparent that the common law per se-
per quod distinction" retains little meaning. Under the common law,
a finding that a defamatory statement was libel or slander per se raised
a conclusive presumption that the plaintiff had suffered injury to his
reputation, and damages, both compensatory and punitive, could be
awarded without further proof of extrinsic facts.6" In contrast, libel
or slander per quod required a showing of injury to the plaintiff from
the defamatory statement.6 5 Under the Jacron negligence standard,
even a statement that is labeled defamation per se must be shown to
59. The court in Jacron gave no guidelines for determining when the New York
Times standard of malice should be applied. Instead, the court merely noted that
"the reckless disregard standard now appears to be firmly established in Maryland
as a test, albeit not the exclusive test, for abuse of a conditional privilege." 276 Md.
at 600, 350 A.2d at 699. See note 27 supra.
60. 276 Md. at 593, 350 A.2d at 696. The different rules applying to libel and
slander evolved largely as a historical accident. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 751-52.
See generally authorities collected in note 12 supra.
61. For an example of the difficulties presented by the libel-slander distinction,
particularly where the defamatory "statement" is an act or a gesture, see General
Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 27 Md. App. 95, 115, 340 A.2d 767, 781 (1975). If the count
alleging slander had referred to tortious acts which were in fact libel, the plaintiff
could not have prevailed. See generally cases cited in 71 A.L.R.2d 808; M & S Furni-
ture Sales Co., Inc. v. De Bartolo Corp., 249 Md. 540, 241 A.2d 126 (1968); American
Stores Co. v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962) ; Thompson v. Upton, 218 Md.
433, 146 A.2d 880 (1958) ; Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158 (1883).
62. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 171 n.2, 352 A.2d 810,
814 n.2 (1976).
63. See generally Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy - The Re-
quirement of Proof of Damages in Libel Actions, 22 CATH. U.L. Rxv. 1, 13-16 (1972).
64. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 762-63.
65. Id. at 762.
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have been made negligently and to have injured the plaintiff.68 There-
fore, the designation has become superfluous.8 7
It should be noted that the Gertz holding was specifically limited
to cases in which "the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent.' "8 But the Court in Gertz
did not indicate how the standard of liability would change if the
defamatory meaning of a statement were not clear enough on its face
to warn the reasonably prudent editor of its potentially damaging
character. 69  Nevertheless, the negligence standard would seem to be
an adequate safeguard to ensure that a publisher is not held liable for
a statement that gives no hint on its face of its defamatory meaning.
Presumably, negligence could not be shown if the statement gave the
publisher no reason to investigate further the truth or falsity of the
statement in relation to the plaintiff.71
Standard of Liability
The Court of Appeals noted in Jacron that Gertz left the states
free to choose any standard except strict liability in cases involving
private plaintiffs.71 The court concluded, however, that the Supreme
Court had expressed a clear preference for a negligence standard, 2
66. See Piskor, 277 Md. at 175, 352 A.2d at 817; note 88 and accompanying text
infra.
67. For an argument that Gertz does not eliminate the per se - per quod dis-
tinction, see Note, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: Constitutional Privilege and the
Defamed Private Individual, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 531, 554 (1975).
68. 418 U.S. at 348.
69. Id. However, the Court cited Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In
that case, the plaintiffs brought an action under a New York right of privacy statute
for an article which appeared in Life magazine about a play allegedly based on the
Hill family's ordeal at the hands of three escaped convicts. The Court held that the
magazine could be found liable only upon a showing of knowing or reckless falsehood,
the New York Times actual malice standard. 385 U.S. at 390. The Court called
negligence
a most elusive standard, especially when the content of the speech itself affords
no warning of prospective harm to another through falsity. A negligence test
would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might
assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every
reference to a name, picture or portrait.
Id. at 389.
It is possible that the Court would require the plaintiff to show actual malice
in cases where the defamatory meaning is not clear on its face. It is more likely,
however, that the Court would accept a negligence standard as adequate protection of
the rights of a media defendant in such cases. See note 70 and accompanying text infra.
70. See Defamation Through Gertz, supra note 18, at 1427-28.
71. 276 Md. at 595, 350 A.2d at 697.
72. Id. at 594-95, 350 A.2d at 696-97. See also Defamation Through Gertz, supra
note 18, at 1426-27. It should be noted that the majority opinion in Gertz left the
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and it adopted the formulation set forth in Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 580B :73
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication
concerning a private person, or concerning a public official or
public figure in relation to a [purely] private matter [not affect-
ing his conduct, fitness or role in his public capacity], is subject
to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames
the other,
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.
The Jacron court also established the quantum of proof necessary to
establish fault as a preponderance of the evidence, the same standard
applied in other negligence actions. 74  Although the court predicted
that trial courts and juries would encounter few problems in applying
the new negligence standard in private defamation cases,7' the concept
of reasonable conduct in relation to defamatory statements lacks con-
trolling precedents;7' a definition must be developed on a case by
case basis.
choice of standard to the states, and it is possible for them to establish a standard
other than negligence. See notes 123 to 130 and accompanying text infra.
73. Tentative Draft No. 21, 1975. See generally Wade, Defamation, the First
Amendment and the Torts Restatement, 11 THE FORUM 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Wade]. This standard also covers public figures or officials when the defamatory
statement relates to a private matter. The Supreme Court defamation decisions have
left open the question of defendant's liability in such cases. See Defamation Through
Gertz, supra note 18, at 1443-48. With the adoption of § 580B, however, Maryland
appears to have chosen the negligence standard. It should be noted that the court
adopted a proposed version of § 580B, Tentative Draft No. 21, which was subsequently
not adopted by the American Law Institute. The language omitted from the official
text of § 580B appears in brackets. See note 135 infra.
74. 276 Md. at 596-97, 350 A.2d at 697-98. The court specifically rejected the
"clear and convincing" standard which some courts have incorporated into their defama-
tion decisions, see, e.g., Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass.
1975), apparently because the Supreme Court used such language in New York Times,
376 U.S. at 285-86. The Maryland court declined to adopt the standard because it
felt that nothing in Gertz mandated its use and because the preponderance of the
evidence standard was required in other forms of action for negligent conduct. 276
Md. at 597, 350 A.2d at 698.
75. 276 Md. at 596, 350 A.2d at 697.
76. The court pointed out, however, that "the negligence standard is not un-
known to common law defamation." Id. at 596, 350 A.2d at 697. For example, in
some jurisdictions a showing of negligence defeats a conditional privilege. See 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 5.27 n.16 (1956); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 601
(1938). A negligence standard has also been applied in connection with the issue of
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Proof
Jacron held that "truth is no longer an affirmative defense, ' 7
and shifted the traditional burden of proving truth or falsity from the
defendant to the plaintiff.78 The court reasoned that because the plain-
tiff is required to prove negligence with respect to the falsity of the
statement, he should also be expected to prove falsity.7 9 The notion
that the burden should shift can be traced to the New York Times
decision, which cautioned that the common law defense of truth, with
the burden of proof on the defendant, fostered media self-censorship."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in New York Times did not place
the burden of proof upon the plaintiff but instead formulated the con-
stitutional privilege to shield speech protected by the first amendment.8"
The Gertz opinion likewise did not address the question which party
should bear the burden of proving falsity.
Whatever the source of its inspiration, the Court of Appeals'
decision to shift the burden may substantially complicate prosecution
of a plaintiff's case. When the burden of proof was on the defendant,
the defamatory statement was presumed to be false, and truth was an
issue only if the defendant specially pleaded the defense.8 2 It is unclear
how the shift will affect this presumption of falsity. Under Jacron
proof of falsity apparently has become an essential element of each
plaintiff's case. In Piskor, where the guards' suspicions that Piskor
was carrying out stolen parts proved to be unfounded, the plaintiff's
burden of showing falsehood was easily satisfied. In contrast, if the
defamatory statement were that the plaintiff habitually stole parts from
the assembly line, proving the statement's falsity would be more diffi-
cult, and the burden would seem to lie more properly with the de-
fendant. The practical difficulties of proving some plaintiffs' cases may
be so great that the abolition of the affimative defense will be given
little effect by the courts beyond the form of the pleadings.
publication in defamation cases. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 774-76. For an argu-
ment that application of the standard may require the use of expert testimony, see
Note, Gertz v. Welch: Reviving the Libel Action, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 450, 464 (1975).
77. 276 Md. at 597, 350 A.2d at 698. See Md. R.P. 342, § c(2) (h).
78. 276 Md. at 597, 350 A.2d at 698.
79. Id. See Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md. 285, 294, 277 A.2d 573, 577 (1971), in
which the Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiff had "the burden of proving not
only actual malice but also that the statements [were] false." See also Wade, supra
note 73, at 12.
80. See 376 U.S. 279; Defamation Through Gertz, supra note 18, at 1381-86.
81. Id.
82. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 798.
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Conditional Privilege
The Jacron court refused to abandon the common law conditional
privileges which attach to most cases of private defamation and re-
jected the suggestion that the negligence standard precluded their use,8"
even though unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant tra-
ditionally had been one basis for defeating a conditional privilege.8 4
The court retained the malice standard as a basis for overcoming a
conditional privilege and it adopted the New York Times standard
of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth as one of the
tests of malice, though not the exclusive one. 5 Thus the court pre-
served the common law doctrine of conditional privilege but related
it to the Supreme Court decisions by incorporating the New York
Times definition of actual malice.
Damages
In Piskor the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff can recover
only actual damages as defined by the Supreme Court in Gertz unless
he satisfies the New York Times standard of actual malice 6 in con-
nection with the publication of falsity. Damages may compensate not
only for measurable pecuniary loss but also for injury to reputation
and infliction of mental distress.81  Given the obvious difficulties in
83. 276 Md. at 598-99, 350 A.2d at 699. But see Wade, supra note 73, at 10.
The court expressly rejected language in Simon v. Robinson, 221 Md. 200, 206-07,
154 A.2d 911, 915 (1959), which suggested that mere negligence might be enough to
defeat a conditional privilege. 276 Md. at 599 n.9, 350 A.2d at 699 n.9. The court
said that "where a common law conditional privilege is found to exist, the negligence
standard of Gertz is logically subsumed in the higher standard for proving malice."
276 Md. at 600, 350 A.2d at 700.
84. See note 27 supra.
85. The court noted that the thrust of recent defamation cases in Maryland has
been to emphasize the reckless disregard of truth standard. See Orrison v. Vance,
262 Md. 285, 277 A.2d 573 (1971); Stevenson v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 250
Md. 482, 243 A.2d 533 (1968) ; notes 27 & 59 supra.
86. 418 U.S. at 349-50. The Supreme Court's enumeration of the harms en-
compassed in the term "actual injury" was by way of example rather than limitation.
The Court left a certain amount of discretion to the trial court's "wide experience
in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions." Id. at 350.
87. See 418 U.S. at 349-50. One critic saw
real mischief here. Negligent infliction of mental distress by publishing false-
hood may well be a tort, but it is not the tort of defamation. . . . If the essence
of the law of defamation is to be preserved in the wake of the [Supreme] Court's
destruction of the conclusive presumption of injury, a defamation plaintiff must
first prove impairment of reputation before he is entitled to recover for personal
humiliation and mental anguish or suffering.
Defamation Through Gertz, supra note 18, at 1438-39.
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proving compensable harm to reputation, the elimination of presumed
damages will make the recovery of damages more difficult."8
On the other hand, by retaining the availability of the conditional
privilege and its accompanying actual malice standard, the court has
assured any plaintiff who is able to defeat a conditional privilege
of the possibility of recovering punitive damages. Therefore, most
private plaintiffs will not be denied the traditional remedy of puni-
tive damages.8 9
DEFAMATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The constitutional branch of defamation law that provided the
basis for the Court of Appeals decisions in Jacron and Piskor is of
relatively recent origin. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,0 libelous statements were considered
undeserving of first amendment protection. 1 Thus, at common law,
88. See Developments in the Law - Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 875, 934-40
(1956). The limitation of damages holding also affects the per se - per quod distinc-
tion. With presumed damages no longer permissible merely because the statement is
defamatory on its face, the per se label has no practical meaning. See note 67 and
accompanying text supra.
89. Most private defamation arises in the context of a conditional privilege; any
plaintiff who overcomes this privilege by a showing of actual malice is entitled to
receive punitive damages under Gertz. It should be noted that the plaintiff may be
allowed to recover punitive damages without proving actual damages in cases where
he has satisfied the burden of showing New York Times actual malice. See Carson
v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 214 (7th Cir. 1976); Newspaper Publishing Corp.
v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 805, 224 S.E.2d 132, 136 (1976). However, in no case under
Jacron will the plaintiff be allowed punitive damages merely by showing that the
defendant had made a statement defamatory on its face.
90. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
91. See Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom
of Speech, 35 MD. L. REV. 555, 573-74, 604 (1976). In Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931), the Court, in articulating the constitutional pro-
hibition of prior restraints, made clear that it was not disturbing the laws relating to
defamation. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (footnote
omitted) reiterated this view:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitu-
tional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or "fighting" words - those by which their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Again in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952), the Court found libelous
statements "not . . . within the area of constitutionally protected speech," and this
statement was quoted with approval by the Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 486-87 (1957). See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 & n.10 (1961).
See also Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961) ; Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946) ; T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
517-62 (1970). The Court in New York Times, however, found that its previous
statements on the subject did not close the door to its application of constitutional
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publishers of allegedly defamatory statements could avoid liability
only through asserting the defenses of truth or privilege. 2 The New
York Times decision arose from an Alabama public official's claim
that he had been libeled by a newspaper advertisement that sought
support for the civil rights movement in the South. The Court con-
cluded that the traditional defenses did not offer sufficient protection
to freedom of expression, and it articulated a new privilege derived
from first amendment principles.9" As a consequence of this privilege,
the plaintiff could recover damages against the newspaper only by
showing that the defamatory statement had been made with "actual
malice,"94 defined by the Court as knowledge that the statement was
false, or recklessness regarding its truth or falsity. 5 Three years later,
in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 6 the Court reiterated its concern for
protecting free and unfettered public debate, extending the first amend-
ment privilege and the accompanying actual malice standard to defama-
tory statements concerning "public figures."' 97  The willingness of a
principles to libel cases. 376 U.S. at 268-69 (1964). "[L]ibel can claim no talis-
manic immunity from constitutional limitations," the Court stated. "It must be meas-
ured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." Id. at 269.
92. See 276 Md. at 584, 350 A.2d at 691.
93. 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court reasoned that critics of public officials should
be allowed freedom of comment similar to that afforded the officials themselves. Id.
at 282. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (publications made by public officials
in the line of duty are absolutely privileged).
94. In effect, the Court in New York Times expanded the common law privilege
of fair comment and gave it a constitutional basis. See Defamation Through Gertz,
supra note 18, at 1366-67.
95. 376 U.S. at 279-80. Knowledge of falsity in this context is equivalent to
the element of scienter required in actions for misrepresentation. See PROSSER, supra
note 12, at 821.
96. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Curtis, the Court considered two cases of libel. One
involved an action by Wallace Butts, the well-known coach of the University of Georgia
football team, against the Saturday Evening Post for an article which charged that
he had "fixed" the game between Georgia and the University of Alabama. The second
action was brought by Edwin Walker, a private citizen well-known for his political
views, against the Associated Press for a misleading account of his role in riots on
the campus of the University of Mississippi. Trial juries in both cases awarded large
sums in compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment against Walker but found that both plaintiffs were "public figures." Id. at 154.
See note 97 infra.
97. Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Justice Warren's concurring
opinion became the accepted statement of the constitutional standard regarding defa-
mation of public figures. See note 6 supra. Justice Harlan, who announced the Court's
result, would have allowed recovery if the plaintiff were able to show, not actual
malice, but "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible pub-
lishers." 388 U.S. at 155. It should be noted that Justices Black and Douglas in this
case, id. at 170 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting and concurring), as in New York
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majority of the Court to extend the application of the actual malice
standard ended with Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.98 Although the
plaintiff in Rosenbloom was neither a public official nor a public figure,
a three-justice plurality9 favored the extension of the constitutional
privilege to defamers of private individuals where the allegedly de-
famatory statements concerned matters of general or public interest.
Statements regarding public issues were considered deserving of the
same first amendment protection as the statements in New York Times
and Butts.'"0 This view shifted the focus of judicial inquiry from the
status of the person defamed to the subject matter of the defamation,
and it divided the Court. Because the Rosenbloom doctrine rested on
the unstable foundation of a plurality opinion, the law was left in a
state of uncertainty as to whom and under what circumstances the con-
stitutional privilege should apply.' 0 ' In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc."2
the Court returned to the issue raised by Rosenbloom.'03 The Gertz
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring),
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398 (1967) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring), and
later in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., con-
curring), expressed the view that the press should be granted an absolute rather than
a qualified privilege.
98. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Rosenbloom was a seller of nudist magazines who was
arrested by the police and charged with selling obscene materials. The police seized
his inventory of 3,000 magazines and books. After Rosenbloom obtained an injunction
against the police prohibiting their interference with his business, he sued a radio
station for its failure to report that the material seized was merely "allegedly" obscene
and for referring to "the smut literature racket" and "girlie-book peddlers" in its news-
casts on the matter. Id. at 32-36.
99. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun. Justice Black concurred but urged an absolute privilege for
the press. 403 U.S. at 57. See note 97 supra. Justice White also concurred but took
the view that the case involved the conduct of public officials and therefore could be
decided in the context of the Court's earlier defamation decisions. Id. at 62. Dissenting
opinions by Justices Marshall (joined by Justice Stewart) and Harlan foreshadowed
the decision in Gertz; Justice Harlan suggested that the proper standard of fault
for defamers of private plaintiffs should be failure to use reasonable care rather than
actual malice. Id. at 72. See note 110 and accompanying text infra. The dissenters
disagreed about the permissibility of allowing punitive damages.
100. See 403 U.S. at 42-43 & n.11.
101. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 354 (1974) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
102. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
103. The Court in Gertz stated:
The principal issue in this case is whether a newspaper or broadcaster that pub-
lishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official
nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the
injury inflicted by those statements. The Court considered this question on a
rather different set of facts presented in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
418 U.S. at 332.
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case provided the Court with an opportunity to retreat to a "common
ground" from which a majority standard might be constructed.10 4
The plaintiff in Gertz was an attorney in a civil suit brought
by the family of a young man who had been shot by a Chicago police-
man. An article published by American Opinion, the organ of the John
Birch Society, on the subject of the policeman's criminal trial labeled
the plaintiff a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter."' ° The article
contained serious inaccuracies, yet the managing editor had not at-
tempted to verify these statements. 10 Having first determined that
Gertz was not a public figure,'0° the Court, speaking through Justice
Powell, held that the New York Times actual malice standard did not
apply to defamatory statements concerning private plaintiffs.'0 8 Fur-
ther, the Court ruled that so long as states did not impose liability
without fault, they were free to define "the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood in-
jurious to a private individual."'0 9 Although it left formulation of
the standard of conduct to the states, the Court indicated that a negli-
gence standard was preferable."0 The Court rejected the "public or
general interest" test of the plurality in Rosenbloom, finding that test
inadequate either to secure free expression or to protect private repu-
tation."' Instead, the Court adopted a different approach to balancing
the state interest in protecting the reputations of private plaintiffs
against defamatory falsehoods and the constitutional interest in free
and uninhibited press. It prohibited the recovery of presumed or puni-
tive damages except where the plaintiff met the more demanding
104. Id. at 339. Justice Blackmun, who had joined the plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom, concurred separately in Gertz to provide the vote that made the decision
a majority holding. Id. at 353-54.
105. Id. at 325-26.
106. Id. at 327.
107. See note 6 supra. The Court reasoned that those who put themselves in the
public limelight would by virtue of their status have easier access to the media to
rebut false statements than would a private person. 418 U.S. at 344.
108. Id. at 343.
109. Id. at 347.
110. Id. at 347-48. The implication is even clearer in Justice Blackmun's con-
curring opinion, id. at 353; Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion, id. at 355;
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, id. at 366. However, the Court limited its
holding to those cases in which "the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent.'" Id. at 348 (citing Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (Harlan, J.)). See notes 68 to 76, 97 and
accompanying text supra.
111. Id. at 346. The Court reasoned:
On the one hand, a private individual whose reputation is injured by defamatory
falsehood that does concern an issue of public or general interest has no recourse
unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times . . . . On the
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burden of showing New York Times actual malice." 2 Absent a show-
ing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, the
plaintiff could recover only actual damages.11s
In a lengthy and forceful dissent,114 Justice White predicted that
the Gertz decision would produce fundamental changes in state defama-
tion law far beyond the factual confines of the decision." 5 Justice
White contended that the law governing the defamation of private
citizens had always been the province of the states, but that the Court
had "federalized major aspects of libel law by declaring unconstitutional
in important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of
the 50 States."" 6 He disagreed with the Court's abolition of strict lia-
bility and argued that presumed damages serve a useful function where
damage to reputation defies precise proof."17  He noted further that
the new rule with respect to general damage appears to apply to
all libels or slanders, whether defamatory on their face or not,
other hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error which a court
deems unrelated to an issue of public or general interest may be held liable in
damages even if it took every reasonable precaution to insure the accuracy of
its assertions.
Id. See also Note, Gertz v. Welch: Reviving the Libel Action, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 450,
459-61 (1975)
112. 418 U.S. at 349. The permissibility under Gertz of recovering punitive dam-
ages upon a showing of actual malice leads to an interesting practical result in
Maryland under the Jacron and Piskor opinions. Because a private plaintiff must
show actual malice to overcome a conditional privilege, see 276 Md. at 598-600, 350
A.2d 698-700, he is automatically entitled to recover punitive damages under the
Gertz guidelines. Therefore, in cases where the defendant claims a privilege, successful
private plaintiffs satisfy the burdens for showing both liability and damages by
proving actual malice. This virtually automatic award of punitive damages may be
justified on the theory that the state's interest in protecting the reputation of individuals
includes punishing those who defame by knowing falsehoods or recklessly, without
regard to the statement's truth or falsity.
113. This limitation of recovery to actual injury was a major point of criticism
in Justice White's dissent. "The Court rejects the judgment of experience that some
publications are so inherently capable of injury, and actual injury so difficult to prove,
that the risk of falsehood should be borne by the publisher, not the victim." Id. at 376.
See notes 117 & 118 and accompanying text inlra. It has also been argued that the
Gertz holding on actual injury would deny compensation to the plaintiff who has
suffered grave damage as a result of a defamatory statement to his good name but
who incurred no pecuniary loss yet, at the same time, would permit recovery by
another plaintiff whose reputation might already have been tarnished but who is able
to prove pecuniary loss or mental anguish. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
Cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460-61 (1976) (plaintiff withdrew claim
for damages to reputation but sought compensation for "personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering").
114. 418 U.S. at 369-404.
115. See id. at 370-71.
116. Id. at 370.
117. Id. at 373. See note 113 supra.
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except . . . when the plaintiff proves intentional falsehood or
reckless disregard . . . Why a defamatory statement is more
apt to cause injury if the lie is intentional than when it is only
negligent, I fail to understand."
8
The majority did not agree that the decision unduly limited the states'
capacity to protect their own citizens against defamatory falsehoods. 19
Rather, Justice Powell insisted that the decision allowed the states
wide latitude to fashion the law of defamation with only the minimal
restraints necessary to protect freedom of the press. 20 Despite Justice
White's predictions of the "scuttling [of] the libel laws of the States
in . . . wholesale fashion,' '1 2' the Court discounted the possibility that
the decision would exact such sweeping changes.12 2
Read narrowly, the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz can be
viewed as simply an attempt to clarify the confusion engendered by
the Court's plurality decision in Rosenbloom and to define more pre-
cisely the scope of the New York Times constitutional privilege. 23
The Court's conclusion that application of the New York Times actual
malice standard was appropriate only in the "context of libel actions
brought by public persons"'124 marked a retrenchment to its pre-
Rosenbloom position.' 5 Because the Court rejected the guidelines
formulated by the Rosenbloom plurality, however, it had to develop a
new set of guidelines for cases in which the plaintiff is a private
118. 418 U.S. at 395.
119. See id. at 347 n.10.
120. See id. at 347-49.
121. Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting).
122. The Court dismissed Justice White's dissent in a footnote to the opinion
which stated in part that "one might have viewed today's decision allowing recovery
under any standard save strict liability as a more generous accommodation of the state
interest in comprehensive reputational injury to private individuals than the law
presently affords." 418 U.S. at 348 n.10.
123. See 418 U.S. at 332-33. The fifth vote necessary to make Gertz a majority
opinion was cast by Justice Blackmun, and he emphasized that his reason for con-
curring in the decision was to end the uncertainties left by Rosenbloom:
The Court was sadly fractionated in Rosenbloom. A result of that kind in-
evitably leads to uncertainty. I feel that it is of profound importance for the Court
to come to rest in the defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority
position that eliminates the unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity.
If my vote were not needed to create a majority, I would adhere to my prior view.
A definitive ruling, however, is paramount.
418 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring). One commentator called Justice Black-
mun's claim that the Court had come to rest "more hope than reality." The Supreme
Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 13, 148 (1974).
124. 418 U.S. at 343.
125. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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person and the defendant a member of the media.'26 The Court formu-
lated these guidelines through the same process of balancing the rights
of the respective parties that it had used in its previous defamation
decisions. 127 In Gertz the Court weighed the interests of the state in
protecting private persons from injuries inflicted by defamatory false-
hoods against the constitutional interest in protecting the media's
first amendment rights; on balance, it considered the reputation of a
private individual worthier of protection than that of a public figure
in the same situation. 128
The majority opinion contains little support for the view that the
Court intended its holding to control all cases involving a private
plaintiff and a nonmedia defendant. Indeed, cases of private, non-
media defamation of a private person involve a balancing scheme of
a different nature from the one considered by the Court in Gertz.1'
In defamation cases involving neither the media nor a public figure,
the long-standing constitutional commitment to freedom of the press
and "robust discussion" is not a factor in the equation. Instead, the
courts must balance one private person's right to compensation for
injury to his reputation against another private person's right to free
expression. The Court has never performed this balancing analysis
nor has it extended the same measure of first amendment protection to
statements made in a' private context as it has provided those made in
a public context.80 In fact, Gertz reiterated the Court's traditional
view that some utterances are not worthy of constitutional protection
because they "are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality."'' Furthermore, the majority
opinion frequently referred to the media,8 2 and it framed the issue in
terms of the need both to compensate the injured person and to avoid
media self-censorship. 3 On its face, then, the Gertz decision expressed
126. See id. at 343-44.
127. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). One commentator wrote that, "The consequence of the Rosenbloom
decision was that the societal interest in an individual's reputation was balanced into
oblivion when it conflicted with the First Amendment concerns of a free press." Note,
Gertz v. Welch: Reviving the Libel Action, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 450, 457 (1975).
128. 418 U.S. at 345.
129. See id. at 342-43; note 53 supra.
130. See Defamation Through Gertz, supra note 18, at 1403-05 & n.228.
131. 418 U.S. at 240 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
132. See, e.g., 418 U.S. at 342-43.
133. Id. at 340-41.
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no constitutional mandate that the states apply its holdings on fault
and damages to purely private defamations.
Viewed broadly, however, Gertz contained elements that might
encourage fundamental change in traditional law. By permitting the
states to adopt a less stringent standard of liability for some media
defendants than the New York Times standard of actual malice and
by prohibiting the award of presumed or punitive damages unless
actual malice were shown, the Court created the potential for anomalies
in defamation law that would require eventual resolution. For example,
the Court of Appeals in Jacron concluded that it would be unwise and
logically inconsistent to hold nonmedia defendants strictly liable while
exposing the media to liability only upon a showing of negligence or
other level of fault.'" The court quoted Comment [d] of Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 580B: 5
It would seem strange to hold that the press, composed of pro-
fessionals and causing much greater damage because of the wider
distribution of the communication, can constitutionally be held
liable only for negligence, but that a private person, engaged in a
casual private conversation with a single person, can be held liable
at his peril if the statement turns out to be false, without any
regard to his lack of fault." 6
Nor could the Maryland court find any persuasive reason to afford
media defendants greater first amendment protection than that granted
to private persons, whose right to free and unfettered expression was
considered equally deserving of protection. 117 Since Gertz prescribed a
negligence standard for media defendants, symmetry dictated that the
conduct of nonmedia defendants be measured by the same standard.
The decision to extend the Gertz holding on standard of liability to all
cases of private defamation led to the application of the Gertz prin-
134. See 276 Md. at 593-94, 350 A.2d at 695-96. The court recognized that the
Gertz holding was "limited to media expression." Id. at 590, 350 A.2d at 694. Never-
theless the court felt obliged to "make an informed prediction as to whether . . . the
Supreme Court will extend the Gertz holding to . . . non-media defendants. Even if
we were to decide here that the Court will not so extend Gertz, we would consider
whether, in any event, we should do so as a matter of state law." Id. at 590-91, 350
A.2d at 694.
135. Id. at 594, 350 A.2d at 696. It should be noted that this Comment is labeled
Comment e in the court's opinion. The court used as its source a proposed revision
of § 580B. See note 73 supra.
136. Tentative Draft No. 21, 1975.
137. Id. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695. This view should be compared with the Supreme
Court's apparent willingness to extend a somewhat greater latitude to statements
published in the media. See note 130 and accompanying text supra.
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ciples on damages. The Jacron court determined that a narrow appli-
cation of the Gertz decision would produce undue confusion:
To limit the Gertz principles to media defendants and to cases
of libel would mean one test, that of New York Times, for defama-
tion of public officials and figures; another, which imposes a
greater degree of proof than strict liability, and bans presumed
and punitive damages, for cases brought by private plaintiffs
against media defendants; and at least one more based on existing
common law principles for all other defamation, an area of tort
law which, wholly apart from the advent of constitutional con-
siderations, has traditionally been noted for its complexity.""
This prospect of chaos in the law persuaded the court that there
was a "compelling need for consistency and simplicity in the law of
defamation."' 9
APPLICATION OF Gertz IN STATE COURTS
Decisions in other state courts have not followed a uniform pat-
tern in their application of Gertz. Even where the plaintiff is a private
person and the defendant is a media member, the courts have split. Some
have adopted the negligence standard, 4 ' while others have retained
the New York Times actual malice standard where the content of the
statement meets the Rosenbloom public or general interest test.'4 '
Some courts have refused to decide at all.' 4 In one case,143 the Colo-
138. 276 Md. at 593, 350 A.2d at 696.
139. Id.
140. See Lawlor v. Gallagher Presidents Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721, 732 n.19
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 198, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299; Gobin
v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 232, 531 P.2d 76, 83 (1975) ; Stone v. Essex
County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 168 (Mass. 1975) ; Martin v. Griffin Tele-
vision, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976). Cf. Corbett v. Register Publishing Co.,
356 A.2d 472, 475 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1975) (court found evidence showed degree of fault
"compatible with the proviso of Gertz") ; Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 178
(Fla. 1974), rev'd 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (semble); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc.
v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 110, 334 N.E.2d 494, 498, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 883 (1975) (remanded without express adoption of negligence standard but with
implication that such a standard would be acceptable).
141. See Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450, 455-56 (Colo. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) ; Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. North-
west Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (Ind. App. 1974). Cf. Safarets, Inc. v.
Gannett Co., 80 Misc. 109, 113-14, 361 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280 (1974) (court remanded
without overturning Rosenbloom public or general interest test as applied in New
York decisions).
142. See Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 192, 334 N.E.2d 79, 88 (1975);
Barbetta Agency, Inc. v. Evening News Publishing Co., Inc., 135 N.J. Super. 214,
221-22, 343 A.2d 105, 109 (1975); Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va.
800, 804-05, 224 S.E.2d 132, 136 (1976).
143. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
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rado Supreme Court declined to adopt a negligence standard on the
ground that such a rule would exert a chilling effect on the news
media.144 Instead, the court held that when the defamatory statement
concerned a matter of public or general interest, the media defendant
would be liable only upon a showing of New York Times actual
malice. 145 Similarly, an Indiana appellate court 46 chose the Rosen-
bloom rather than the Gertz standard because it feared that a negligence
standard would foster media self-censorship. 47 Nevertheless, the ma-
jority of state courts faced with the Gertz issue have accepted the
Supreme Court's invitation to adopt negligence as a basis for deter-
mining liability.148 In Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.,'49
the defendant newspaper published an article that mistakenly identified
the plaintiff as the possessor of a harmful drug.' Although the editor
144. 538 P.2d at 458.
145. Id. A dissenting opinion criticized the majority's reliance upon the Rosen-
bloom standard which, it said, "had little vitality when it was announced and even
less today" and noted that Rosenbloom was a plurality decision that had been rejected
by the Court in Gertz. The dissent would have adopted a negligence standard. Id. at
460 (Erickson, J., concurring and dissenting).
146. Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321
N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1974).
147. Id. at 586. The stubborn adherence in the wake of Gertz to the Rosenbloom
plurality's public or general interest test suggests that in some cases society's interest
in robust discussion may not adequately be protected unless the courts examine the
content of the speech as well as the status of the plaintiff. See id. at 588-89; Walker
v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450, 457-58 (Colo. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1025 (1975).
148. See cases cited at note 140 supra.
149. 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975).
150. Under traditional defamation law, the plaintiff would have alleged libel
per se, because the defamatory meaning of the article was clear on its face. The
article also met the criterion of the Gertz decision that the substance "[makes] sub-
stantial danger to reputation apparent." 418 U.S. at 348 (quoting Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (Harlan, J.)). If the content of the article had not
been sufficient to put the editor on notice of its potentially defamatory character, under
the Gertz decision, the Massachusetts court presumably might have declined to apply
the negligence standard. See notes 68 to 70 and accompanying text supra. To date,
however, no court has applied a negligence standard where the defamatory meaning
of the statement has not been obvious. See Lawlor v. Gallagher Presidents Report,
Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721, 724-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (statement that plaintiff was guilty
of conflict of interest and had "extracted fees for placement of executives") ; Troman
v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 188, 340 N.E.2d 292, 294 (1975) (newspaper picture and
caption implied plaintiff's home was headquarters for burglary gang) ; Gobin v. Globe
Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 224, 531 P.2d 76, 77 (1975) (newspaper article stated
plaintiff had pled guilty to charge of animal cruelty) ; Stone v. Essex County News-
papers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 165 (Mass. 1975) (newspaper article wrongfully identi-
fied plaintiff as possessor of "harmful drug") ; Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549
P.2d 85, 87 (Okla. 1976) (television "Call for Action" program broadcast complaints
about conditions at plaintiff's pet store).
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knew that the plaintiff was an upstanding citizen, he failed to check
the reporter's notes. 5 ' The Massachusetts court decided that the
defendant could be held liable on a showing of negligence, even where
the defamatory statement occurred in the reporting of a matter of
general or public interest.', 2 The court found persuasive the rationale
advanced in Gertz that private persons deserve greater protection
against defamatory falsehoods than public figures or officials because
the latter have easier access to the media for rebuttal. 5 3 It is note-
worthy in light of the Gertz holding on damages that the Massachusetts
court declined to allow the award of punitive damages under any cir-
cumstances, including cases in which actual malice has been shown ;154
it reasoned that punitive damages would impermissibly interfere with
the state's interest in protecting freedom of speech and the press. 155
Among the courts that have confronted cases of purely private
defamation, only the Maryland Court of Appeals has applied the Gertz
holdings.'56 Indeed, several cases in other jurisdictions did not even
cite Gertz."7 One case, Calero v. Del Chemical Corp.,'58 presented a
factual situation similar to that in Jacron. The plaintiff brought an
action for defamation against his former employer, alleging that the
defendant had falsely informed potential employers that he had taken
confidential company papers and attempted to lure away key personnel
in order to organize a competing company.'5 9 At trial the plaintiff
was awarded actual damages, presumed damages, and punitive dam-
151. 330 N.E.2d 161, 165 (Mass. 1975).
152. Id. at 164.
153. Id. at 168-69. See 418 U.S. at 344.
154. The Gertz decision allowed the recovery of presumed or punitive damages
on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. See 418
U.S. at 349. For a discussion of the recovery of damages in Maryland after the
Jacron and Piskor decisions, see notes 86 to 89 and accompanying text supra.
155. 330 N.E.2d at 164. The court also required that the plaintiff establish his
case by "clear and convincing proof" rather than merely by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
156. See Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975);
Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1975); Tendler
v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 788, 118 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1974) [Tendler
was deleted from 43 Cal. App. 3d on direction of the California Supreme Court by
order dated May 8, 1975. Hereinafter citation will be to the unofficial report alone.] ;
Southland Corp. v. Garren, 135 Ga. App. 77, 217 S.E.2d 347, rev'd on other grounds,
235 Ga. 784, 221 S.E.2d 571 (1976); Carter v. Catfish Cabin, 316 So. 2d 517 (La. 1975).
157. Southland Corp. v. Garren, 135 Ga. App. 77, 217 S.E.2d 347, rev'd on other
grounds, 235 Ga. 784, 221 S.E.2d 571 (1976); Carter v. Catfish Cabin, 316 So. 2d 517
(La. 1975). It seems apparent that the question of Gertz's application was never raised
in these cases.
158. 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
159. Id. at 489-95, 228 N.W.2d at 739-42.
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ages.""° The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that Gertz did not
apply because the case involved no media defendants, no matters of
public concern and no public officials or figures. As a consequence, the
relevant policy considerations did not flow from the first amendment
but instead were based upon the "encouragement of a free exchange
of information . . . [in the course of] the inquiry by a prospective
employer of a former employer."' 61 The court upheld all damage
awards, including the one for punitive damages. 162 The court affirmed
the availability of a conditional privilege and held that a showing of
express malice was required to overcome the privilege. It defined
express malice as ill will, envy, spite or revenge, x6' and distinguished
this standard of conduct from actual malice, which it defined as
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard with respect to truth or
falsity.' 64 The court determined that the actual malice standard applied
only in the presence of a constitutional privilege. 65 In effect, the
Calero court dismissed the Gertz decision as inapplicable; it deter-
mined that traditional common law principles continued to govern cases
in which a private plaintiff is defamed by a nonmedia defendant.' 6
The California courts likewise declined to apply Gertz in two
cases involving conditional privileges, though in a different factual
setting than that present in Jacron and Calero. In Tendler v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc.'67 and Roemer v. Retail Credit Corp.,'1 the plaintiffs
filed defamation suits against credit reporting services that had sup-
plied factually inaccurate reports about plaintiffs' credit standing.1 69
160. The trial court awarded $3000 for damages to plaintiff's feelings, general
reputation and good name, $7000 for loss of income, and $9000 punitive damages. Id.
at 495, 228 N.W.2d at 742. See also General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 27 Md. App. 95,
340 A.2d 767 (1975).
161. 68 Wis. 2d 487, 506, 228 N.W.2d 737, 748 (1975). It is noteworthy that the
Maryland court, faced with similar policy considerations in lacron, retained the con-
ditional privilege and adopted the New York Times actual malice test as a standard
for defeating the privilege. See notes 83 to 85 and accompanying text supra.
162. 68 Wis. 2d at 510-12, 228 N.W.2d at 750-51.
163. Id. at 506, 228 N.W.2d at 748. This is the common law definition of express
malice in Maryland as well. See Deckelman v. Lake, 149 Md. 533, 536, 131 A. 762,
764 (1926) ; Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 96, 20 A. 774, 775 (1890). See note 27 supra.
164. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80. See notes 27,
94 & 95 and accompanying text supra.
165. 68 Wis. 2d 487, 507, 228 N.W.2d 737, 748 (1975).
166. The Court of Appeals in lacron noted Calero's rejection of Gertz as inappli-
cable to cases of private defamation but "decline[d] to follow that authority, since
the court there simply limited its examination to the question of whether it was
bound by Gertz." 276 Md. at 596, 350 A.2d at 697.
167. 118 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1974).
168. 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1975).
169. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 930-31, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (1975) ; 118 Cal. Rptr. at 276
(1974). The California Court of Appeal had held in an earlier case that a qualified
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Both cases required a showing of malice in order to overcome the
privilege."' The court in Roemer held that "the libelous communica-
tion presented in a credit report falls outside the protective umbrella
of the First Amendment'17  because the speech was commercial in
nature and the reports were provided to a relatively limited audience. 172
CONCLUSION
Nothing within the factual or legal confines of the Jacron or Piskor
cases mandated the Court of Appeals' complete revision of the state's
common law of defamation. For example, it would have been acceptable
for the court to construe the Gertz holdings narrowly and limit their
application to media defendants. 7 ' Furthermore, like the other private
defamation cases' 74 decided after Gertz, both Maryland cases turned
upon the presence of a conditional privilege. Since the Court of Appeals
did not want to disturb the common law governing privilege, 75 it
might have restricted its decision to the narrow question of privilege," 6
leaving the broader questions raised by Gertz to be resolved when
they arose in other cases. Nevertheless, the court in Jacron rejected
this piecemeal approach to changes in defamation law, 7 7 choosing in-
privilege was present in dealings between a mercantile credit report agency and the
companies which requested their reports. See Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 3 Cal.
App. 3d 368, 83 Cal. Rptr. 540, 542 (1970).
170. 118 Cal. Rptr. at 276; 44 Cal. App. 3d at 933, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 86. See Roemer
v. Retail Credit Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 308, 83 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1970).
171. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 933, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
172. Id. at 934, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 87. The court pointed out, however, that "the
precise question here raised [whether credit reports are protected by the New York
Times actual malice standard] has not, as yet, been definitively decided by the
United States Supreme Court. On the contrary, Rosenbloom . . . explicitly leaves this
issue open." Id. at 933, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 86. It should be noted that credit report
cases have presented problems for the courts, resulting in varying standards of fault
adopted by different states. See Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUTGERS-
CAMDEN L.J. 471, 491-95 (1975).
173. See notes 130 & 131 and accompanying text supra.
174. See Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82
(1975); Tendler v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1974); Southland
Corp. v. Garren, 135 Ga. App. 77, 217 S.E.2d 347, rev'd on other grounds, 235 Ga.
784, 221 S.E.2d 571 (1976); Carter v. Catfish Cabin, 316 So. 2d 517 (La. 1975);
Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
175. See Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. at 597-601, 350 A.2d at 698-700.
176. This approach was taken by the court in Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis.
2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975), see notes 158 to 166 and accompanying text supra,
although it is not clear how the court would have held in the absence of the privilege.
177. See 276 Md. at 593-94, 350 A.2d at 696; notes 134 to 139 and accompanying
text supra.
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stead to construct a unified theory of state defamation law based upon
the Supreme Court's decision.'
The prospect of a unified law of defamation - stripped of archaic
or illogical 179 distinctions between libel and slander, actions per se and
per quod, express and actual malice - is an appealing one. Neverthe-
less, the simplicity and clarity which the Jacron court sought to impose
on the law of defamation exists in theory only. Justice Blackmun's
hope that, with Gertz, the Court had "come to rest in the defamation
area"'8i has proved premature, and the Court of Appeals' attempt in
Jacron to restructure the state common law in the Gertz mold has
raised new problems. The law of defamation, both in the Supreme
Court and in Maryland, remains uncertain.
In its most recent defamation decision, Time, Inc. v. Firestone,""'
the Supreme Court considered the defamation action of a wealthy
socialite against Time magazine, which had falsely reported that her
husband had been granted a divorce on the ground of adultery. 8 2
Because the record of the state appellate proceedings failed to disclose
whether the plaintiff had proved fault on the part of the defendant, the
Court remanded the case to the Florida court.8 " Under the Gertz
rationale, proof of the defendant's fault in publishing the defamatory
statement is a necessary predicate to liability. Although five members
of the Court joined in the majority opinion, 8 4 Justice Powell noted
in a concurring opinion that while "[a] clear majority of the Court
adheres to the principles of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., . . . it is
evident from the variety of views expressed that perceptions differ as
to the proper application of such principles to this bizarre [Firestone]
case."' 85 A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals
178. 276 Md. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695.
179. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 737-38; Veeder, The History and Theory
of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 546 (1903) ; Defamation Through Gertz,
supra note 18, at 1354-57, 1370-74.
180. 418 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
181. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
182. Id. at 451-52.
183. Id. at 464.
184. Id. at 449. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Powell wrote a con-
curring opinion in which Justice Stewart joined. Justice Powell noted that he joined
the opinion of the Court "[i]n order to avoid the appearance of fragmentation . . .
on the basic principles involved." Id. at 464. Justices Brennan, White and Marshall
dissented. Justice Stevens did not participate.
185. Id. at 464. Justice Powell indicated that the majority had not explored suffi-
ciently the application of the negligence standard to the facts of the case: "My point
in writing is to emphasize that, against the background of a notorious divorce case ...
and a decree that invited misunderstanding, there was substantial evidence supportive
of Time's defense that it was not guilty of actionable negligence." Id. at 470.
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for the Fourth Circuit, Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp.,'8 6 further illustrates
the confusion that continues to plague the law of dafamation. Sauer-
hoff brought a defamation action in federal court against the Baltimore
News-American based on an article in the paper which implied that he
had engaged in extramarital affairs. Because the case arose before
Jacron, the district court judge applied the Maryland common law of
defamation and dismissed the action on that basis without reaching
the constitutional issues. Although the defendant in Sauerhoff was
a member of the media, the Fourth Circuit's opinion did not emphasize
first amendment considerations or the Gertz decision.18 7  Instead, the
court's discussion focused entirely on the common law doctrines of
libel per se and per quod.' s' The court ignored Jacron, which had
been decided in the interim between the district court's action and the
appellate decision, even though the decision was theoretically based
on Maryland law. 89 The case was remanded for reconsideration of
the judgment in view of the Gertz holding on damages, which the
court noted had been adopted by Maryland in Jacron.9 °
Maryland appellate courts faced with defamation cases after
Jacron have avoided much of this confusion by deferring the difficult
task of refining the new doctrine; they have merely remanded the
cases for new trials under the Jacron and Piskor guidelines.' Until
the new standards are applied by trial courts and juries, the potential
problems raised by Gertz and the Maryland decisions remain conjec-
tural. The most likely source of contention, however, will be the in-
186. 538 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1976).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 590-91. It should be noted that the court acknowledged without
applying the statement that "Gertz possibly discourages use of a per quod premise."
Id. at 590.
189. The Fourth Circuit's failure to apply Jacron to the Sauerhoff case is puzzling.
The Supreme Court has held that a federal appellate court reviewing a decision in a
diversity action should apply the existing state law, even if it has been altered subse-
quent to the district court decision. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S.
538 (1941); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTs 238 & n.12 (2d ed. 1970). In
Vandenbark, the Court stated that "the dominant principle is that nisi prius and
appellate tribunals alike should conform their orders to the state law as of the time
of entry. Intervening and conflicting decisions will thus cause the reversal of judg-
ments which were correct when entered." 311 U.S. at 543. Since the Fourth Circuit
was aware of Jacron, it should have applied the the Maryland Court of Appeals' new
approach to defamation. Application of Jacron would have obviated the need to
grapple with the confusing and outdated doctrines of libel per se and per quod.
190. 538 F.2d at 591-92.
191. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 172, 352 A.2d 810, 815
(1976); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lascola, 31 Md. App. 153, 159-60, 355 A.2d 757,
766-67 (1976); Stephens v. Dixon, 30 Md. App. 56, 66, 351 A.2d 187, 193 (1976).
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creased burden that the new scheme places upon private plaintiffs to
prove falsity, negligence, and actual damages.'92
That Jacron may eventually place an increased burden on private
plaintiffs is anomalous. The Gertz decision was grounded in the
Supreme Court's support of the state's interest in protecting the reputa-
tions of private plaintiffs, 9 ' and the Maryland Court of Appeals ex-
plained its comprehensive alteration of defamation law by reference to
Gertz. Ironically, application of Gertz to all cases of defamation
involving private plaintiffs may subvert the underlying rationale of
Gertz. Recovery may become more difficult for those private plaintiffs
who are defamed by nonmedia defendants and whose injury to reputa-
tion has not been manifested in a loss of income or other measurable
damages. 194 The amount of protection afforded the reputation of
private plaintiffs thus will be eroded.
It is impossible to predict the Supreme Court's reaction to the
application of the Gertz principles to cases of private defamation,
although Firestone indicates that the Court still adheres to the view
that the private plaintiff is especially deserving of the state's protec-
tion1 5 and that the states retain wide discretion in setting the standards
of liability. 96 The Supreme Court may allow state defamation law to
develop in its own direction with only minimal constitutional re-
straints.11 7 If it does, other states eventually will be faced with the
same theoretical conflicts that the Maryland court considered in
Jacron.95 It is likely, however, that some courts will not depart so
readily from their traditional law as did the Maryland court. Defama-
tion decisions involve a balancing of interests, 9 and other courts may
decide for reasons of policy that some plaintiffs should be given favored
treatment2° or that media defendants deserve special treatment because
their first amendment rights are more critical than those of private
defendants.20' Whether Jacron is an attractive solution to the ques-
192. See notes 82, 88 and accompanying text supra.
193. 418 U.S. at 344-46.
194. See id. at 371-77 (White, J., dissenting); note 88 and accompanying text
supra.
195. See 424 U.S. at 453-57; note 16 and accompanying text supra.
196. See 424 U.S. at 461-64; note 109 and accompanying text supra.
197. Cf. Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 461-64.
198. See notes 134 to 139 and accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 127 to 129 and accompanying text supra.
200. For example, the Supreme Court in Gertz determined that private plaintiffs
are deserving of greater protection against media defendants than are public plaintiffs
because the latter have easier access to the media for rebuttal. See 418 U.S. at 344.
201. The Court of Appeals rejected this view in Jacron. See notes 127 to 129 and
accompanying text supra.
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tions raised by Gertz will depend on whether the logic of equal treat-
ment of all plaintiffs and all defendants seems compelling when con-
sidered in conjunction with other policy factors.202  Gertz itself pro-
vides no constitutional mandate for this symmetry.20 3 If the problems
inherent in distinguishing between the constitutional and common
law branches of defamation prove to be overly burdensome and arti-
ficial, 204 however, most jurisdictions are likely to adopt unified schemes
that parallel the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Jacron.
202. See notes 138 & 139 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
use of symmetry as a ground for altering the course of a legal doctrine see H. Hart
& A. Sachs, The Legal Process 601-02 (tent. ed. 1958).
203. See notes 129 to 133 and accompanying text supra.
204. See notes 138 & 139 and accompanying text supra.
